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Applying Historic Preservation Ordinances to Church Property:
Protecting the Past and Preserving the Constitution
"It's a red-hot issue,"1 according to New York State Senator John Flynn.
In May 1983 New York City's Interfaith Commission introduced a bill in the
General Assembly that would have exempted houses of worship from local
preservation laws. This move was the latest round in the battle between reli-
gious organizations and preservationists in New York City. Although the
New York General Assembly rejected the bill, 2 the battle still rages.
At the center of the controversy is St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church,
on Park Avenue. The church requested the Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion's approval to build a fifty-nine story office complex over the landmark
church structure.3 Proponents of the development plan had also requested
that the church be decertified as a landmark.4 They assert that the landmark
designation infringes their first amendment right to free exercise of religion
because the designation places restrictions on how they can alter or dispose of
church property.5 Opponents of the landmark designation contend that the
Landmarks Law "leaves the church in the position of requiring secular ap-
proval for a decision on how to use its resources."' 6 They further assert that
churches have a constitutional right "not to be hindered by landmark laws."
'7
Preservationists and a group of St. Bartholomew's parishioners oppose
the church's plan because it would destroy "one of the most priceless and irre-
placeable church edifices in New York City." 8 They contend that the first
amendment argument is specious and that the issue has been raised only be-
cause the church cannot make a successful case for relief based on economic
hardship.
St. Bartholomew's is not alone in contesting its landmark designation.
The St. Paul and St. Andrew United Methodist Church has filed suit against
the New York Landmarks Commission for $30,000,000 in damages allegedly
suffered as a result of its landmark designation. The church also has alleged
that the landmark designation violated its first amendment rights.9 This case
has not been decided.
The intense debate over the constitutionality of applying historic preser-
vation laws to churches has not been settled. The debate focuses on two con-
stitutional questions: when does the application of historic preservation laws
to churches abridge the first amendment guarantee of free exercise of reli-
1. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1983, at B6, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1983, at D18, col. I.
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
4. Id at B24, col. 6.
5. Id at A1, coI. 3.
6. Id. at col. 4.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Landmark Churches Raise Constitutional Issues, 2 PRESERVATION L. REP. 1061 (1983),
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gion 10 and what standard should be applied to determine whether a historic
preservation law, as applied to church-owned property, is so burdensome that
it constitutes a taking?"l The United States Supreme Court has not addressed
either issue. Very few lower courts have dealt with the taking issue and case
law concerning the first amendment issue is particularly sparse.
12
It is difficult for courts to determine standards for treatment of church
property. The prohibitions of the first amendment13 place the courts squarely
between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, courts cannot infringe on
the free exercise of religion by enforcing preservation laws too strictly. On the V
other hand, the establishment clause of the first amendment dictates that
courts cannot uphold laws that constitute an impermissible establishment of
religion by granting churches preferential treatment.'
4
It is difficult to formulate broad rules to apply in every case involving
church-owned property. Whether there is a first amendment violation or a
taking' s depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There is, how-
10. See infra text accompanying notes 46-118.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 119-211.
12. The only case that deals squarely with a historic preservation regulation and the free
exercise of religion is Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980). Societyfor Ethical Culture also addresses the taking issue. Other cases that
deal with whether application of a historic preservation regulation of church property constitutes a
taking include Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,316 N.E.2d 305, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); First Presbyterian Church v. City Council, 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257
(1976).
13. The United States Supreme Court explained the difference between the free exercise
clause and the establishment clause in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite differ-
ent kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment
Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental encroachment, and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an
official religion, whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals
or not.
Id. at 430.
14. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the United States Supreme Court
articulated the test to determine whether a statute is constitutional within the ambit of the estab-
lishment clause. First, the statute must have a secular purpose. Second, the statute's primary
effect must neither inhibit nor advance religion. Third, the statute must not foster excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. The establishment clause was made applicable to the states
under the fourteenth amendment in 1947. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
In the context of historic preservation, a governmental unit risks violating the establishment
clause if it applies historic preservation ordinances more leniently to church property than to other
types of property, or exempts church property from such ordinances altogether. This issue soon
will be addressed in the case of Old Independence, Inc. v. Board of Deacons of the First Baptist
Church of Independence, No. 83-1042-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo. filed Sept. 15, 1983). Churches are
now exempt from the demolition and alteration restrictions imposed within the Harry S Truman
Heritage District. Old Independence asserts that the exemption contravenes the establishment
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. For a fuller discussion of the establishment
clause in the context of historic preservation, see Xeller, The Impact of the FirstAmemtrent on the
Preservation of Religious Structures, 3 PRESERVATION L. REP. 2005 (1984).
15. A "taking" occurs when the government deprives a private landowner of the use or bene-
fit of his land without just compensation. See infra text accompanying notes 119-28. There is no
standard to determine when a historic preservation regulation so interferes with a property
owner's rights that the government must compensate the owner. The standard to determine when
a regulation constitutes a taking depends on whether property is used for commercial purposes or
church purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 129-54 (taking in a commercial context) and
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ever, a clear need for courts to announce general principles for the application
of historic preservation regulations to church property. Clear standards will
enable local government bodies and owners of church property to work to-
gether more effectively and balance the sometimes conflicting goals of preserv-
ing historic churches and upholding the Constitution.
In 1933 the federal government began to list historically significant struc-
tures in the Historic Buildings Survey. It is estimated that by 1971 over half of
these buildings had been destroyed.16 Only in the past twenty-five years has
there been a widespread effort to enact legislation to protect historic structures.
Today all fifty states have preservation laws; 17 over one thousand local preser-
vation ordinances' s and several federal statutes protect historic properties. 19
The daily operations of designating and regulating historic properties
take place at the local level. State enabling legislation authorizes local govern-
mental units to designate both historic districts and historic landmarks.20 A
historic district is an area of historical, cultural, or architectural significance
that possesses integrity of design, setting, materials, feeling, and association.2 1
A historic landmark, sometimes called a historic property, is an individual,
often isolated, building of historic, cultural, or architectural value.
22
To analyze the constitutional questions regarding application of historic
preservation laws to churches, the procedure for designation and regulation of
historic districts and landmarks must be understood. North Carolina's historic
text accompanying notes 155-211 (takings in the context of property owned by a church or other
charitable organization).
16. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 n.2 (1978).
17. Id. at 107.
18. Duerksen, Preface to A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW xxi (C. Duerksen
ed. 1983).
19. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982); 16 U.S.C. § 470a
(a)(1) (1982); 23 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4361(1982). See generally Fowler, Federal Historic Preservation Law: National Historic Preserra-
tion Act, Executive Order 11593, and other Recent Developments in Federal Law, 12 WAKE FOREST
L. Rav. 31 (1976) (reviewing development of federal scheme protecting historic properties).
20. Some states authorize the designation of historic districts or historic properties through
the general zoning power. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1976). Most state
statutes, however, authorize the designation of historic districts and historic properties and also set
forth administrative procedures for designation and regulation. A typical example is the North
Carolina historic preservation legislation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174(a) (1982) is a general del-
egation of the State's power to municipalities: "A city may by ordinance define, prohibit, regulate
or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens
and the peace and dignity of the city, and may define and.abate nuisances." N.C. GEN, STAT.
§§ 160A-395 to -399 (1982) set forth the administrative procedure for designation and regulation
of historic districts. See infra text accompanying notes 30-33. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 160A-399. I to
-399.13 (1982) set forth the administrative procedure for historic properties. See infra text accom-
panying notes 24-29. A few states have constitutional provisions concerning historic preservation.
Most notable is the Louisiana Constitution, which authorizes the use of historic district zoning,
LA. CONST. art. 6, § 17, and formerly authorized a commission to preserve historic properties in
the Vieux Carre in New Orleans. LA. CONST. art. 14, § 22A (1921, deleted but not repealed 1974).
For a thorough overview of state historic preservation laws, see Beckwith, Developments In the
Law of Historic Preservation anda Reflection on Liberty, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93 (1976).
21. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-395.1 (1982).
22. The distinction between a historic district and an individual historic landmark sometimes
is integral to a-court's resolution of a constitutional issue, particularly in the taking context. See
infra text accompanying notes 176-97.
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preservation legislation 23 illustrates the procedure used in many states. Before
a city or county may pass an ordinance designating a historic property, it must
establish a historic properties commission.24 The historic properties commis-
sion recommends individual properties for designation and holds a public
hearing on the proposed ordinance.2 5 The North Carolina Department of
Cultural Resources reviews the proposal.z6 If the local governing body ac-
cepts the commission's recommendation and adopts the ordinance designating
the historic property, the owner and occupants of the property are given writ-
ten notification.27 After property receives a historic designation, the owner
must obtain a certificate of appropriateness 28 to alter, restore, move, or demol-
ish the property.
29
To establish a historic district, the local legislative body must submit a
report on the area's historical significance to the North Carolina Department
of Cultural Resources.30 The city or county must establish a historic district
commission.31 After the historic district is designated, a certificate of appro-
priateness must be obtained from the commission before the exterior portion
of any building or other structure within the district may be reerected, altered,
restored, moved, or demolished.32 In North Carolina, historic districts can be
implemented either as separate-use districts with their own regulations or as
23. The North Carolina General Assembly rewrote the historic preservation legislation in
1979, granting municipalities the authority to designate historic districts and historic properties.
For an account of the legal issues municipalities encounter in the area of historic preservation, see
Johnston, Legal Issues of Historic Preservation for Local Government, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
707 (1981). For a discussion of historic preservation in North Carolina, see Morgan, Reaffirmation
of Local lnitiative: North Carolina'r 1979 Historic Preservation Legislation, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 243
(1980); Ross, Practical Aspects of Historic Preservation in North Carolina, 12 WAYE FOREST L.
REv. 9 (1976); Comment, The North Carolina Historic Preservation and Conservation 4greements
4ct: Assessment and Implications for Historic Preservation, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 362 (1980).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-399.2 (1982).
25. Id. § 160A-399.3(5), -399.5(4).
26. Id § 160A-399.5(3). The Department of Cultural Resources has the authority to review
and comment upon the substance and effect of the proposed designation of a historic property. If
the Department does not respond in writing within 30 days of the receipt of the historic properties
commission's report, the commission is relieved of responsibility to consider the comments. Id
27. Id § 160A-399.5(5) to (6).
28. The procedure for obtaining a certificate of appropriateness for a historic property is the
same as the procedure used for a historic district. Id § 160A-397; see infra note 32. If the owner
of a designated historic property or a building within a historic district alters the property but fails
to obtain a certificate of appropriateness, the owner is subject to the penalties set forth in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-175 (1982). A certificate of appropriateness is not required for ordinary main-
tenance or repair, or when the building inspector determines that an emergency exists regarding
the building's safety. Id §§ 160A-398, -399.7. The historic properties commission may not deny a
certificate of appropriateness for demolition of a historic building; the commission, however, may
require a 180-day waiting period to negotiate with the owner or to find alternative means of pre-
serving the building. Id § 160A-399.6.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-399.6 (1982).
30. Id. § 160A-395.
31. Id § 160A-396. The same commission may serve for historic districts and historic
properties, or a planning agency may serve as the commission. Id §§ 160A-396, -399.2.
32. Id § 160A-397. The commission has jurisdiction only over exterior features. See id.
(definition of "exterior features"). The commission must adopt procedures for the issuance of
certificates of appropriateness. The owner of a historic building is entitled to a hearing on the
certificate of appropriateness, and the commission's decision may be appealed to the North Caro-
lina Board of Adjustment and then to an appropriate superior court. Id.
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overlays that impose additional regulations on existing zoning districts. 33
The relationship between historic districts and traditional zoning is im-
portant. Traditional zoning is directed at the use of land and the density and
location of buildings. Historic district zoning is concerned only with the pres-
ervation of the exterior of buildings with historical significance. 34 The under-
lying concepts and goals of historic district zoning and traditional zoning,
however, are the same.
35
It is logical for courts to look to the thousands of reported cases dealing
with traditional zoning for guidance in resolving historic district zoning issues.
Historic preservation law still is in the formative stage. By contrast, courts
have resolved many of the major constitutional issues regarding traditional
zoning. Thus, courts have applied by analogy the tests and guiding principles
developed in traditional zoning cases to resolve constitutional issues in historic
preservation cases.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York Cit0 6 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of historic preservation restric-
tions for the first time. The Court upheld the validity of New York's
Landmarks Preservation Law, as applied to Grand Central Terminal. 37 After
the Landmarks Preservation Commission rejected plans to construct a fifty-
story office building above Grand Central Terminal, a designated landmark,
the Terminal's owners filed suit, claiming that the application of the
Landmarks Preservation Law constituted a taking of their property in viola-
tion of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.38 The Court
upheld the Landmarks Law and approved the concept of landmark and his-
toric district legislation. Thus, "Uj]ust as the U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court
placed its imprimatur on zoning in the 1920s, so has it now spoken in favor of
zoning's sibling, preservation controls .... 3
33. An overlay zone, sometimes called a floating zone, differs from "Euclidean," or separate-
use, zoning. Euclidean zoning divides a community into specific districts and assigns a particular
land use (residential, commercial, or industrial) to the district. 2 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS § 13.0111], at 13-2 n.3, 13-3 n.4 (1984). All districts are given an immediate classi-
fication which freezes the acceptable type of land use for that district. Id at 13-2. The procedure
for implementing an overlay zone is different. The local government decides to establish a district
for a special use, such as a historic district, but does not designate immediately the boundaries of
the district. The special use thus "floats" above the district until the boundaries are defined. Id at
13-5.
34. Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 291, 316 A.2d 807, 821
(1974).
35. Zoning is the most important method of preservation. 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 33,
§ 7.01[l], at 7-9. Both traditional zoning and histonc district zoning seek to preserve the "har-
mony of the neighborhood." Id. § 7.0113], at 7-17. This fact led the Missouri Court of Appeals to
note that a "historic district ordinance is essentially a zoning ordinance." Lafayette Park Baptist
Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). The court further stated
that, "[als a zoning ordinance [a historic district ordinance] is subject to the same historic tests
established by [courts in traditional zoning cases]." Id In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), Justice Brennan relied on a long line of traditional zoning cases and
applied them in a historic preservation context. Id at 123-25.
36. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. Id at 138.
38. Id at 119.
39. Duerksen, Local Preservation Law, in A HANDBOOK ON HisToRIc PRESERVATION LAW
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The Penn Central Court, however, did more than sanction the concept of
preservation legislation. The Court also resolved several major questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of preservation controls. First, the Court rejected
the argument that landmark laws are discriminatory zoning because they ap-
ply only to selected parcels.4° The Court concluded that, unlike discrimina-
tory zoning, New York's Landmarks Preservation Law "embodies a
comprehensive plan" to preserve historic buildings.4 1 Therefore, application
of preservation restrictions to individual landmarks as well as to entire historic
districts is constitutional. Second, the Court confirmed the notion that aesthet-
ics alone is a proper basis for land-use restrictions. 42 Last, the Penn Central
Court announced guidelines for determining whether the application of a his-
toric preservation law constitutes a taking.
43
Penn Central resolves some important constitutional questions. It is un-
likely that the historic preservation concept will be challenged again.44 His-
toric preservation regulations, however, have been and will continue to be
challenged on the basis of factual distinctions.45 One important distinction
that has generated challenges, both on first and fifth amendment grounds, is
the application of historic preservation regulations to church property.
The first amendment right to free exercise of religion ensures the. freedom
to hold religious beliefs.46 The first amendment, however, does not immunize
every activity undertaken by a religious organization from government regula-
tion. Activities of a religious organization merit first amendment protection
only when they are "integrally related" to underlying religious beliefs-when
the activities involve a "fundamental tenet" or "cardinal principle."47 Thus,
the first amendment does not immunize a religious organization from reason-
29, 30 (C. Duerksen ed. 1983). Duerksen refers to Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), in which a property owner challenged a zoning ordinance on the ground that it decreased
the value of the land and deprived the owner of property without due process of law. Duerksen,
supra note 18, at 31. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, which excluded industrial estab-
lishments from residential districts, on the ground that the ordinance bore a rational relation to
the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. Eueli 272 U.S. at 394-95.
40. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132.
41. Id
42. Id at 129. Appellants did not contest this point, yet the Court still reiterated its approval
of aesthetics as a basis for land-use regulation. This approval is important authority for preserva-
tionists in jurisdictions in which the state courts have been slow to recognize aesthetics alone as a
legitimate basis for land-use regulations.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 131-49.
44. Seidel, Landmarks Preservation after Penn Central, 17 REAL PROP., PROB. & Ta. J. 340,
355 (1982).
45. Id
46. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
47. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963) (unconstitutional to deny unemployment
benefits to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to accept job that required work on Saturday,
which would violate cardinal principle of her religion); Lakewood Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir.) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (Wisconsin's school compulsory-attendance law unconstitutional as applied
to Amish because law was at odds with fundamental tenet of Amish religious beliefs)), cert. de-
nied 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
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able governmental regulation when that organization acts in secular matters.48
.. / To determine whether a historic preservation regulation interferes with a
church's proposed use of its property, courts apply a two-step analysis. First,
if the church proposes to use its property in a purely secular manner, courts
uphold the historic preservation or zoning regulation and look no further.4 9
This analysis requires courts to determine what constitutes a secular use of
church property. If the church's use of its property is characterized as religious
rather than secular, however, courts advance to the second step, balancing the
government's interest in enforcing the regulation against its interference with
religion to determine whether the regulation violates the free exercise clause.
In an attempt to delineate what constitutes a secular use, one commenta-
tor has suggested that no income-producing use of church property is secular
or commercial when the proceeds support the church's religious activities and
missions.50 Under this view, it is not a secular or commercial activity when a
church redevelops its property and leases it to a nonreligious tenant if the in-
come derived from such use funds religious activities. The courts, however,
have not embraced this extreme view.51
In Societyfor Ethical Culture v. Spatt,52 for example, the New York Court
of Appeals took an opposing view. The court held that the development of
property for rent to nonreligious tenants would be a "purely secular" activ-
ity.5 3 Thus, the court determined that a landmark designation that prevented
this development did not interfere with the free exercise of the Society's reli-
gious activities.
Three cases dealing with traditional zoning further illustrate what consti-
tutes a secular use. Even the selection and use of a building for worship serv-
ices may be a secular use. In Lakewood Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses,
48. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 456, 415 N.E.2d 922, 926, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (1980).
49. Id
50. See Greenawalt, Church and State: Some Constitutional Questions in Landmarking of
Church-Owned Properties, in PRAcrisma LAW INsT., HISTORIC PRESERYATION LAW 1982 46J,
472-73.
51. Although judicial interpretation of what constitutes a religious activity or use has been
expansive, it has not been as expansive as Greenawalt's view. The use of a church or synagogue
for worship services is a religious use. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65. Courts also have
found religious uses in activities ancillary to the actual worship service and buildings ancillary to
the actual sanctuary. See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONINO § 12.25 to .26
(2d ed. 1982). See also Twin-City Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 50 Ill. App. 3d 924, 365
N.E.2d 1381 (1977) (use of residential building across the street from main church building for
Sunday school and fellowship classes is religious use); Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten,
63 Misc. 2d 978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1970) (operation of day-care center on church property is
religious activity).
A particular land use can be secular, however, even when a religious organization uses the
land. As a New York court noted, "fi]t is the proposed use of the land, not the religious nature of
the organization, which must control." Bright-Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121
Misc. 2d 703, 709, 469 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1983). Thus, a residential care facility is not a church
for zoning purposes, even though it is run by a religious organization and the patients pray and
contemplate as part of the healing process. Id
52. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
53. Id at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
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Inc. v. City of Lakewood,54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit upheld a municipal zoning ordinance that prohibited the construction
of church buildings in most residential districts within the city limits. The
Congregation claimed that the ordinance violated its free exercise of religion
because the ordinance precluded the Congregation's construction of a new
church on a lot in a residential district. The court of appeals emphasized that
the Congregation remained free to worship in other churches or meeting halls
throughout the city 55 and held that "building and owning a church is a desira-
ble accessory of worship, [but] not a fundamental tenet of the Congregation's
religious beliefs."
'56
State v. Cameron57 also involved a zoning ordinance that excluded places
of worship from zones restricted to single-family dwellings. The New Jersey
Superior Court found Reverend Cameron guilty of violating the zoning ordi-
nance by holding worship services in his home,58 and held that the ordinance
did not violate the free exercise of religion within the meaning of Wisconsin v.
Yoder.59 The court noted that holding services in a minister's home was a
permissible element in the church's tradition but was neither central to nor
required by the church's beliefs. Because holding services in a location outside
a residential zone would not force the congregation to perform acts "'at odds
with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.' "60 The court held that the
ordinance only restrained the congregation from "performing acts that are in
keeping with its secular interests." 61 Thus, the court conclided that a congre-
gation's interest in establishing a place of worship at a location of its own
choosing is a secular interest.
62
In contrast, Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown63 illustrates a purely
religious use of a church building. In Westchester the site had been selected
and the sanctuary already was being used for worship services. To meet the
needs of its growing membership, the congregation needed to expand its syna-
gogue. The proposed expansion, however, would have violated a setback re-
quirement;64 compliance with the setback requirement would have cost the
54. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
55. Id. at 307.
56. Id
57. 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (Law Div. 1982), aff'a4 189 N.J. Super. 404,460 A.2d 191
(App. Div. 1983).
58. Id. at 84, 445 A.2d at 84. The court imposed no penalty on Reverend Cameron. Id
59. Id at 81, 445 A.2d at 83 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). The court
concluded that the ordinance did not violate a fundamental tenet of religion. See supra note 47
and accompanying text (discussion of Yoder).




63. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968). The court did not have to rely
on the secular-use/religious-use dichotomy to reach its decision. This same New York Court of
Appeals, however, labeled the use in Westchester as religious in contrasting it with the secular use
in Socielyfor Ethical Culture. Society for Ethical Culture 51 N.Y.2d at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926,
434 N.rY.S.2d at 936 (Westchester "dealt with restrictions actually impairing religious activities").
64. Westchester, 22 N.Y.2d at 492, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
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congregation an additional $100,000. The New York Court of Appeals stated
that compliance with the restriction would impair religious activities and con-
cluded that application of the setback requirement would violate the free exer-
cise clause of the Constitution.
6
From these cases emerge guiding principles to determine whether the use
of church property is religious or secular. Further analysis, however, is re-
quired to determine whether there is a violation of the free exercise clause. If
the congregation is using an existing building for its worship services, courts
usually deem the use religious. Thus, if the restriction interferes with the abil-
ity to worship, there is an infringement on the free exercise of religion, and
application of the balancing test is necessary. A congregation's interest in
building a new church on a preferred site, however, probably will be consid-
ered secular. Although application of the second prong of the test is not re-
quired in this situation, the court is likely to inquire further, to ensure that
there are other reasonable locations available to build a church,66 so as not to
impair the free exercise of religion. Finally, if the congregation itself does not
use the property but instead wishes to develop the property and rent it to non-
religious tenants, a court will find a secular use and uphold the historic preser-
vation regulation without further inquiry.67
Once a court has determined that the church's proposed use of its prop-
erty is not purely secular, the court must determine whether the zoning or
historic preservation regulation places such an undue burden on the church
that its members' free exercise of religion is impaired. The court must ex-
amine the circumstances of each case to discern what type of burden the regu-
lation imposes on the church,68' and must examine the nature of the state's
interest in its regulation to determine whether the state's purpose can be ac-
complished by a less burdensome means.
69
Sociey for Ethical Culture0 is the only case that deals squarely with a
church's claims that a historic preservation regulation impairs its free exercise
or religion. The court, however, did not reach the balancing test, since its
finding that the Society sought to use church property for a purely secular
purpose was conclusive on the free exercise issue.71 Because Societyfor Ethi-
cal Culture offers no guidance on how to apply the balancing test, cases apply-
ing traditional zoning ordinances to churches must be examined for guidance.
To apply the balancing test between the state's regulatory interest and the
alleged burden on the free exercise of religion, the crucial question is whether
a court should afford special deference to church property in applying zoning
65. Id at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
66. Lakewood Congregation, 699 F.2d at 307; Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. at 81, 445 A.2d at 82.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 126-27.
69. See infra note 105 and text accompanying note 98.
70. 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980).
71. Id at 456, 415 N.E.2d at 926,434 N.Y.S.2d at 936; seesupranotes 52-53 and accompany-
ing text.
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ordinances. A line of New York cases grants great deference to churches.7 2 In
these cases the policy favoring religious structures always outweighs public
policy considerations; the court notes only one factor-that the burden falls
upon church property-and then terminates its inquiry without examining any
other factors.
In Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown7 3 the New York Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether a zoning setback requirement should be applied to a
synagogue seeking to expand. The court first cited its earlier holding that reli-
gious facilities are, "by their very nature, 'clearly in furtherance of the public
morals and general welfare.' 74 The court noted that churches occupy a dif-
ferent status from commercial enterprises and "'when the church enters the
picture, different considerations apply.' ,,75 Thus, when there is an irreconcila-
ble conflict between the right to build a church and public welfare concerns,
the latter must yield to the former.76 This deference to churches was injected
into the balancing test again in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorpo-
rated Village of Rosly Harbor.77 The court stated that the "special status of
religious institutions under the First Amendment freedom of religion is clearly
the dominant factor."
78
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Jewish Reconstructionist Syna-
gogue, however, disagreed with the Westchester court's extreme deference, or
"absolutist" approach.79 The "nonabsolutist" view80 has been embraced in
recent cases. In Holy Spirit Association for the Unftcation of World Christianity
v. Town of New Castle8 l the United States District Court for the Southern
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-86.
73. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
74. Id. at 493, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (quoting In re Diocese of Rochester v.
Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862 (1956)).
75. Id. (quoting In re Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d
827, 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 859 (1956)).
76. Id at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. In Westchester the Planning Commis-
sion of the Village of Scarsdale argued that the public interests relating to traffic and the diminu-
tion of adjoining property values outweighed the religious interests of the synagogue. Id at 494,
239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
77. 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975), cert. denieg 426 U.S. 950
(1976).
78. Id at 287, 342 N.E.2d at 537, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
79. In his concurring opinion Chief Judge Breitel stated:
I agree with so much of the dissent as characterizes the majority expression of the law as
too absolutist in providing a preference and even to some extent an immunity from sig-
nificant zoning regulation for premises devoted to religious uses. . . . It is the all but
conclusive presumption that considerations of public health, safety and welfare are al-
ways outweighed.. .by the policy favoring religious structures that I find objectionable.
Id. at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 540-41, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (Breitel, C.J., concurring). Justice Jones'
dissent stated that notwithstanding churches' "favored status in the law of zoning, nonetheless,
they can be held to 'appropriate restrictions.'" Id at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 757
(Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136
N.E.2d 827, 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 863 (1956)).
80. See supra note 79 (Chief Justice Breiters statement of "nonabsolutist" view).
81. 480 F. Supp. 1212 (1979). The Unification Church sought an injunction to compel the
zoning board to issue a special-use permit for the church to operate a 98-acre "religious retreat" in
a residential area. The court dismissed the motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that it would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if the zoning board
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District of New York applied the nonabsolutist approach to a zoning ordi-
nance affecting church property. The court held that the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of religious expression "cannot be viewed as absolute"
when it conflicts with the public safety, health, and welfare.82 When a legiti-
mate conflict arises, incidental infringement on religious expression is consti-
tutionally permissible.
83
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court also has em-
braced the nonabsolutist view. In In re Holy Spirit Associationfor the Unifica-
tion of World Christianity v. Rosenfeld84 the court stated that local
governments must make every effort to accommodate religious organizations'
land uses.85 The court emphasized, however, that government regulation of
religious practices that are a substantial threat to public peace, safety, or order
does not abridge the constitutional guarantees of the free exercise of religion.
86
Other courts also have advocated a nonabsolutist approach.87 In Bethle-
hem Evangelical Church v. City of Lakewood88 the Colorado Supreme Court
concluded that there is no first amendment violation if a city requires a church
to make certain street improvements as a condition to receiving a permit to
build a gymnasium on its property. The court stated that although churches
have received preferential treatment, "church construction is subject to such
reasonable regulations as may be necessary to promote the public health,
safety or general welfare."89
In City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church"° a church operated a school in
further investigated the church's request for a special-use permit. Id. at 1214. The court also held
that requiring the church to apply for a special-use permit was not a prior restraint. Id at 1215.
82. Id at 1216.
83. Id The court relied on Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zon-
ing ordinance requiring "adult" theatres to be certain distance from other "adult" theatres and
from residential areas is constitutional). The court cited Chief Justice Breitel's concurring opinion
in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue. See supra note 79. The court also emphasized the "ex-
treme significance" of the state's police power in the zoning area. New Castle, 480 F. Supp. at
1216.
84. 91 A.D.2d 190, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1983). This case involved the same proposed religious
retreat that was at issue in New Castle. See supra note 81. The court upheld the dismissal of the
church's petition seeking a judgment that the town's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional.
85. Rosenfela 91 A.D.2d at 198, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
86. Id In In re Islamic Soc'y v. Foley, 96 A.D.2d 536, 464 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1983), the court
reiterated that local zoning boards should apply ordinances more flexibly to church property but
noted that church property is not exempt from zoning ordinances. In dictum, the Supreme Court
of Monroe County in Bright-Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 Misc. 2d 703, 469
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1983), noted that the general policy, as applied in New York, is that "religious
institutions are virtually immune from zoning restrictions." Id at 710,469 N.Y.S.2d at 856. This
statement ignores the recent curtailment of the absolutist view imposed by higher New York
courts.
87. See Lakewood Congregatioi4 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983);
Bethlehem Evangelical Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1981); Pillar of Fire v.
Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973), aft'a, 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d
23 (1976); East Side Baptist Church v. Klein, 175 Colo. 168, 487 P.2d 549 (1971); State v. Cam-
eron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (Law Div. 1982), aff'a 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191
(App. Div. 1983); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
88. 626 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1981).
89. Id. at 674.
90. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
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the basement of the church building. The trial court held that the church must
comply strictly with zoning and building ordinances or cease to operate the
school.91 The church members claimed that the uncompromising enforcement
of the building codes violated their first amendment right to free exercise of
religion.92 The Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court had
erred in granting the city injunctive relief without balancing the government's
interest in enforcing the ordinances with the church's right to free exercise of
religion.93 The court offered helpful guidelines for applying the balancing
test.
94
When the City, in the exercise of its police power, is confronted
with rights protected by the First Amendment, it should not be un-
compromising and rigid. Rather, it should approach the problem
with flexibility. There should be some play in the joints of both the
zoning ordinance and the building code. An effort to accommodate
the religious freedom of appellants while at the same time giving ef-
fect to the legitimate concerns of the City as expressed in its building
code and zoning ordinance would seem to be in order.95
The more recent trend is to embrace the nonabsolutist approach to the
balancing test. The absolutist view is too conclusory; it precludes courts from
examining all the facts of the case. City of Sumner demonstrates that a court
applying the nonabsolutist approach still must acknowledge the special status
of first amendment rights as an important factor in the balancing test. A
charge of infringement of the free exercise of religion, however, should not be
a talisman to end the inquiry without considering all pertinent facts.
In addressing first amendment claims against historic preservation regula-
tions, courts can be expected to apply the balancing test in the same manner in
which the test has been applied in other land-use cases.96 In Pillar of Fire v.
Denver Urban Renewal Authority9 7 the Colorado Supreme Court applied a
balancing test to determine whether the Urban Renewal Authority could con-
demn a church building. The court "must balance the interests in the contro-
versy. . . and the state must show a substantial interest without a reasonable
alternative means of accomplishment."98 The court instructed the lower court
on remand to weigh the plans and goals of the Renewal Authority against the
right of the Pillar of Fire Church to maintain a building that the church
claimed was unique and did not conform to the general development plan for
the area.99 The balancing test weighed in favor of the state because the re-
91. Id at 4, 639 P.2d at 1361.
92. Id.
93. Id at 9, 639 P.2d at 1363.
94. "[The] court's function is to balance the interests of the parties and if an accommodation
cannot be effected, determine which interest must yield." Id. at 8, 639 P.2d at 1362.
95. Id at 9-10, 639 P.2d at 1363-64.
96. See Xeller, supra note 14, at 2011.
97. 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973), af§'don rehg, 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976).
98. Id at 418, 509 P.2d at 1253. The court held that urban renewal is a substantial state
interest. Id.
99. Id. at 420, 509 P.2d at 1254.
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newal project would not be possible if the nonconforming Pillar of Fire
Church remained in the center of the block.1°
In Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewoodt'0 the
Colorado Supreme Court again applied a balancing test and held that requir-
ing a church to improve the streets surrounding its property did not violate the
first amendment.10 2 A key factor in the decision was the nature of the regula-
tion's impact on the church's first amendment rights. The regulation inter-
fered only minimally with the free exercise of religion; this fact tipped the
scales in favor of the State.103
In State v. Cameron'o4 a New Jersey court used the same balancing test
applied by the Colorado Supreme Court.l °S The New Jersey court deter-
mined that an ordinance excluding places of worship from zones restricted to
single-family dwellings had only slight and incidental impact on the free exer-
cise of religion.1°6 The court further noted that the ordinance did not regulate
any religious belief and did not require anyone to "act in a manner contrary to
his or her religious belief."'1°7
On the other side of the scale, the zoning ordinance satisfied the standard
necessary for an ordinance to be justified when it has a slight and incidental
impact on first amendment rights. In Cameron the city had a substantial inter-
est in excluding churches from single-family districts. Although places of wor-
ship could "be considered inherently beneficial," they also could "have a
deleterious effect on the tranquility of the single-family zones in which their
operations are located."108 The presence of churches also could have an unde-
sirable effect on property values.'0 9 After balancing these factors, the court
concluded that the zoning ordinance did not infringe the free exercise of
religion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the same
type of ordinance in Lakewood Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v.
City ofLakewood."0 The ordinance excluding churches from residential dis-
100. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of Fire, 191 Colo. 238, 241, 552 P.2d 23, 25
(1976).
101. 626 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1981).
102. The court found that the city had "a substantial interest in developing streets which will
facilitate the safe and free flow of traffic." Id. at 675. The city also had an interest in "the mainte-
nance of and liability for the streets within its jurisdiction." Id
103. Id
104. 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (Law Div. 1982), affa 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191
(App. Div. 1983); see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
105. The New Jersey court articulated the test as follows: The ordinance is justified if it "sub-
stantially further[s] a legitimate and important government purpose unrelated to suppression of
First Amendment activity while infringing upon such activity to no greater an extent than is essen-
tial to furthering that purpose." Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. at 80, 445 A.2d at 82.
106. Id The court noted that church members living in zoning districts that did not permit
churches could attend places of worship in nearby districts. Id at 76-77, 445 A.2d at 80-81V
107. Id at 79, 445 A.2d at 82.
108. Deleterious effects include litter, noise, traffic, and congestion. Id at 75, 445 A.2d at 80.
109. Id at 76, 445 A.2d at 80.
110. 699 F.2d 303 (6th. Cir.), cert. dentea 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983); see supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
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tricts precluded the Jehovah's Witnesses from building a church on the lot
they desired. The court found that requiring the congregation to build its
church in a commercial or multi-family residential district did not infringe on
religious freedom because restricting the choice of a site for their meeting hall
did not pressure the congregation to abandon its beliefs and observances. 11
The only burdens imposed on the congregation were the increased cost of
purchasing land in a different district and "the violation of the Congregation's
aesthetic senses." 112 Relying on Braunfeld v. Brown,113 the court concluded
that "[i]nconvenient economic burdens on religious freedom do not rise to a
constitutionally impermissible infringement of free exercise."' 14 As in Braun-
feld, the ordinance in Lakewood Congregation affected only what the court
considered a secular activity, and the ordinance merely made "'the practice of
their religious beliefs more expensive.' "115
Braunfeldoffers guiding principles that are useful in determining the con-
stitutionality of traditional zoning regulations and historic preservation regu-
lations.116 The Braunfeld test is essentially the same test enunciated in other
cases; Braunfeld balances the state interest against first amendment rights.
The Braunfeld test is more useful, however, because it enumerates the major
factors courts should consider in balancing a zoning or historic preservation
ordinance against the free exercise of religion. First, the purpose of the regula-
tion must be the advancement of a secular purpose; the burden on religious
observance must be indirect. Second, the regulation should be the only feasi-
ble, effective means to accomplish the state's purpose. If a less restrictive
means is available, that alternative means should be used. Last, the church
property must be used for religious, not secular, purposes to invoke first
amendment protection. 
117
The Braunfeld Court discussed why statutes that impose only an indirect
burden should stand. The Court stated: "To strike down, without the most
critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the ex-
111. Lakewood Congregation, 699 F.2d at 307.
112. Id.
113. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws upheld as proper exercise of state power even
though incidental economic burden placed on Jewish merchants who rested from work on
Saturday).
114. Lakewood Congregation 699 F.2d at 306.
115. Id. at 307 (quoting Braunfeld 366 U.S. at 605).
116. See generally Bonderman, Freedom of Religion and Historic Preservation; in PRACTISING
LAW INST., HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1982 457, 459 (Braunfeld balancing test has become
"hallmark of analysis" of this issue).
117. The Braunfeld Court noted:
If the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose
and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by
means which do not impose such a burden.
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. Historic preservation regulations generally meet the Branfeldcriteria.
Under the Braunfeldrule, it appears that historic preservation statutes can be applied to churches
"except, perhaps, in those cases where the church would be entirely prevented from using its
property in a way necessary to religious exercise and there are less restrictive alternatives."
Bonderman, supra note 116, at 460.
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ercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious
practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legisla-
ture."118 This is particularly true in the application of historic preservation
statutes to churches. The purpose of historic preservation statutes is to pre-
serve irreplaceable buildings having cultural, architectural, or historical signif-
icance. Churches often are distinctive or even unique in their architectural
design and frequently are historically significant. Therefore, churches often
will be designated as historic properties and will play an integral part in any
historic preservation program. The inclusion of churches within historic pres-
ervation statutes is especially important when a church is part of a historic
district because the central idea is to preserve the area's integrity of design and
setting. If churches were excluded from historic districts whenever the congre-
gation invoked first amendment claims, it would be difficult to preserve the
unity of a historic district. Undue deference to churches would result in an
even more rapid loss of historic structures.
Courts must look at all the facts of each case and weigh those facts care-
fully. The balancing process requires courts to recognize the special status of
first amendment rights without granting these rights undue deference. In this
manner, courts can protect the free exercise of religion without contravening
the establishment clause, and at the same time preserve historically significant
churches.
In addition to first amendment challenges, historic preservation zoning
has been challenged under the fifth amendment "just compensation" clause.
The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides that "no person
shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."'1 9 This proscription has been extended by the fourteenth amendment
to state and local actions. 120 Thus, a taking of private property by the federal,
state, or local government for public use without just compensation is
unconstitutional.
Numerous landowners have challenged land-use regulations on the
ground that the regulations are so burdensome that they constitute a taking of
the landowner's property in violation of the fifth or fourteenth amend-
ments. 121 Although a few lower courts have addressed the taking issue in the
context of church property, the United States Supreme Court never has ad-
dressed the issue in the context of a regulation applied to church property. On
several occasions, however, the Court has addressed the taking issue in the
commercial property context. 122 The standards developed for commercial
property form the foundation for developing a standard for church
118. Braunfela 366 U.S. at 606.
119. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
120. Chicago, B.& Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
121. See generally 1 P. RoHAN, supra note 33, §§ 1.05[1] & [2], at 1-82 to -94 (overview of
constitutional challenges to zoning laws); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964) (examination of "taking" theories).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 129-52.
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property. 123
Two important factors shape the search for a "taking" standard to apply
to church property. First, the Supreme Court has been unable to develop a
"set formula" to determine what constitutes a taking. 124 The effect of the un-
settled nature of the law on those who seek guidance on the taking issue was
stated effectively in Chief Judge Breiters Penn Central opinion, later affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court. Breitel stated that "one does not pursue
a path guided by ample precedent or wholly developed principles. . . .The
last word has not been spoken; it has hardly been envisaged." 125 This proposi-
tion is true especially in the context of church property.
The second important factor in the establishment of a taking standard is
that determining whether there has been a taking "'depends largely upon the
particular circumstances [of the] case.' "126 Particularly in the context of
church property, courts engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." 127
Thus, the only practical method to determine whether the application of a
historic preservation regulation to church property constitutes a taking is to
examine the particular circumstances and contrast those circumstances with
analogous commercial taking cases.
128
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon129 the Supreme Court stated the gen-
eral rule: "[WIhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 30 With this general rule pro-
viding guidance, the Supreme Court in Penn Central131 set forth several fac-
tors that are particularly significant in the context of a taking claim.
132
The first factor is the impact of the regulation, particularly "the extent to
123. An understanding of taking cases involving commercial property is essential to analyzing
cases involving alleged takings of church property. First, even though the standard applied to
commercial property is not the same as the standard applied to church property, the court asks the
same question in both instances to determine whether there has been a taking. That question is
whether the land-use regulation so interferes with the property owner's intended or actual use of
the property that the owner deserves compensation because he no longer can use the property for
its intended purpose. Second, churches sometimes use their property for commercial purposes.
See infra text accompanying notes 168-173 and 206-07. Last, courts have applied concepts devel-
oped in commercial property cases to church property cases. See infra text accompanying notes
180-97.
124. Penn Centrah 438 U.S. at 124.
125. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 337, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1279, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 922 (1977), aff'a 438 U.S.
104 (1978).
126. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. 357
U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
127. See id.
128. Bonderman, Federal ConstitutionalIssues, in A HANDBOOK ON HIsTolIc P.ESERVATION
LAW, supra note 18, at 353 (C. Duerksen ed. 1983).
129. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Pennsylvania Coal involved a due process claim. The line of cases
that originated with Pennsylvania Coal, however, treat a regulation that goes too far as a taking in
violation of the fifth amendment. Bonderman, supra note 128, at 351 n.24.
130. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
131. 438 U.S. at 123-28. For a description of the Penn Centralcase, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 36-45.
132. Justice Brennan concluded that the fact that the Landmark Law had a more severe im-
pact on some landowners than others did not, of itself, ef ect a taking. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
132. For other important factors, see infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
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which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions. 1 33 This rule does not mean that the government must compensate a
landowner for every regulation that diminishes his property value. 134 A regu-
lation that denies a landowner "the most beneficial use of his property"'
35
does not constitute a compensable taking. Nor is a diminution in property
value a compensable taking.1 36 In Penn Central the Supreme Court cited a
line of "no taking" cases with approval137 and determined that the landmark
regulation which prevented development of an office tower that would have
netted one hundred fifty million dollars over a fifty-year period was not a tak-
ing. 138 The Court, however, has found a taking when the challenged regula-
tion completely destroyed the landowner's property rights.
13 9
Historic preservation regulations have an economic impact because they
require landowners to maintain their property in a particular manner. Penn
Central, however, upheld a landmark regulation that precluded a property use
which would have yielded sizeable profits1 4° In other cases dealing with
property in historic districts, courts have required owners to find some reason-
able use for their property, even if that use is not lucrative or in fact causes the
landowner economic loss.14 1 The guiding principle gleaned from these cases
is that "land-use regulations may severely restrict property as long as there is
some reasonable remaining use."
142
The second significant factor in determining whether a taking has oc-
curred is the character of the governmental action.143 "A taking may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion of the property. . . than when interference arises from some
133. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
134. On the contrary, in cases in which the state court has reasonably concluded that the
health, safety, and general welfare would be benefited by prohibiting a proposed land use, the
Supreme Court has upheld land-use regulations that have diminished or even destroyed property
values. Id at 125.
135. Id at 125 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962), which upheld
ordinance banning excavations below the water table; claimants alleged that defendant's excava-
tions shut down their sand and gravel mining business).
136. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court up-
held a zoning ordinance that reduced the claimant's property value by 75%. In Hadachek v. Se-
bastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Supreme Court found no taking where a regulation forced an
owner to close down his brick factory, reducing his property's value by more than 90%.
137. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-35; see also supra notes 135-36.
138. In Penn Central the Court found no taking because the landowners still could earn a
"reasonable return" on their investment and still were permitted the "reasonable beneficial use of
the landmark site." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131-38.
139. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). A mining company had reserved subsurface
mining rights from landowners. A subsequent state statute forbidding exploitation of these min-
ing rights was held an unconstitutional taking because it made coal mining commercially imprac-
ticable and destroyed the value of the company's reserved rights.
140. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
141. See, eg., Dempsey v. Boys' Club of St. Louis, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(no demolition allowed); Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (no demolition allowed); First Presbyterian Church v. City Council of York, 25 Pa.
Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976) (owner could not show lack of reasonable use).
142. Bonderman, supra note 128, at 353.
143. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good." 144
Preservation ordinances rarely involve any physical invasion. This factor,
however, does embody two notions relevant to a preservation ordinance's ef-
fect on property. First, the severity of the restriction's effect can be an impor-
tant factor-the more severe the restriction, the more a court will be inclined to
hold that the restriction is tantamount to a physical invasion. Second, the
character-of-the-action factor implicitly recognizes the court's willingness to
consider whether the regulation produces benefits as well as burdens.
145
Designation as a historic site or district can bring numerous benefits. Because
historic properties attract tourists and visitors, property values often increase
when a historic area is restored and maintained.146 Thus, historic preservation
can strengthen the economy of the historic area and the city. A court will
consider these benefits to determine the severity of the regulation's impact.
The third factor the Penn Central Court deemed important to determine
whether a taking had occurred is whether the regulation promotes the
"'health, safety, morals or general welfare by prohibiting particular contem-
plated uses of land.' 147 When the Court has found such public benefit, it has
upheld land-use regulations "that destroyed or adversely affected recognized
real property interests." 148 Zoning laws are the "classic example" of such
land-use regulations.'
49
This factor can weigh heavily in favor of upholding historic preservation
ordinances, especially after Penn Central. The appellants in Penn Central did
not challenge New York City's objective of preserving historic structures.'
50
Nevertheless, the Penn Central Court expressed its approval of historic preser-
vation as a valid exercise of the police power. The Court noted that "in a
number of settings" it had recognized the valid objective of land-use controls
"to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aes-
thetic features of a city.' 5 ' In fact, the Penn Central Court's support for his-
144. Id at 125; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(television cable installed on claimant's building); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979) (government imposed navigational servitude to give public access to private pond); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (plane flights above claimant's land destroyed present use of
land as chicken farm).
145. This is the average-reciprocity-of-advantage notion recognized in Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 415.
146. 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 33, § 7.01[3], at 7-14 to -15 & n.27.
147. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
148. Id. at 125; see, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Appellants in Goldblatt
claimed an ordinance prohibiting excavations below the-water table prevented them from continu-
ing their sand- and gravel-mining business. The Court did not believe that the ordinance denied
appellants any use of the land, finding the evidence indecisive on the reasonableness of prohibit-
ing further excavation below the water table. The Court weighed heavily the countervailing pub-
lic safety factors involved (holes in fence around lake and many schoolchildren in the area). Id. at
595.
149. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. An instructive application of this third factor is found in
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
150. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129.
151. Id
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toric preservation, demonstrated by its upholding the constitutionality of the
concept, has given local governments new confidence in adopting and enforc-
ing historic preservation ordinances. 15 2
With the principles developed in cases relating to commercial property153
to guide them, courts must formulate standards to determine when the appli-
cation of a historic preservation ordinance to church property constitutes a
taking. The key question is what standard to apply when the property in ques-
tion is used for religious or charitable purposes. The standard applied to com-
mercial property is whether the regulation still affords the landowner the
"reasonable beneficial use" of the property.1 54
Very few courts have had to decide which standard to use in determining
whether a land-use regulation effects a taking of church property. The courts
that have faced the issue have determined that the reasonable-return-on-in-
vestment standard is not applicable to church property.' 55 "[C]haritable orga-
nizations are not created for financial return in the same sense as private
businesses." 15
6
As in all taking cases, determinations of which standard to apply and
whether a taking has occurred turn on the particular facts of the case. 5 7 From
the existing cases two tests have evolved to determine if application of a his-
toric preservation ordinance applied to the property of a church or charitable
organization is a taking.
The first test that has evolved is the charitable-purpose test. This test was
first enunciated in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt.158 Sailors' Snug
Harbor is a charitable organization that provides a home for retired seafaring
men. The seamen's dormitories were a group of buildings on Staten Island,
described as "one of the two best examples of Greek Revival architecture in
the country." 159 The charitable organization sought to vacate the buildings'
designation as a landmark, contending that the landmark designation consti-
tuted a taking because it precluded the demolition of these buildings to make
way for more modem structures.160 Although the court did not determine
whether there was a taking, it did set forth the standard for determining the
taking issue on remand. The court noted that there is a taking of commercial
property when the owner cannot earn a reasonable return. 161 The court then
stated that a taking of charitable property occurs "where maintenance of the
landmark either physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes with
152. Seidel, supra note 44, at 355.
153. See supra note 123.
154. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
155. See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
156. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 454, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932, 935 (1980).
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
158. 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968).
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carrying out the charitable purpose."'162
Six years later the Court of Appeals of New York applied this charitable-
purpose test in Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York.163 The
Church's office, a freestanding brownstone townhouse surrounded by modem
multistory commercial structures, was a designated landmark. Plaintiff, the
Lutheran Church in America, used the building for offices for its "corporate-
religious purposes."' 164 Even after a wing was added to the building, it still
was inadequate for the organization's needs.165 Plaintiff claimed that the cor-
porate-religious use of the building would have to cease because the landmark
designation prevented the organization from replacing the building.166 Thus,
plaintiff sought a declaration voiding the landmark designation.
In Lutheran Church plaintiff prevailed because the court determined that
the application of the Landmarks Law to this particular building was a taking.
The court explained that the commission's "attempt[s] to force plaintiff to re-
tain its property as is, without any sort of relief or adequate compensation, are
nothing short of a naked taking."'167 Applying the charitable-purpose test, the
landmark restrictions, if enforced, would prevent the religious organization
from achieving its charitable purpose.
In Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt 6g the Court of Appeals of New
York again applied the charitable-purpose test, but concluded that no taking
had occurred. The Society, a tax-exempt religious and charitable organiza-
tion, owned a valuable piece of property fronting Central Park that was
known as the Meeting House. The Meeting House was a designated
landmark. 169 The Society argued that application of the landmark restrictions
was a taking because it would "prevent the exploitation of the full economic
value of the Central Park West property."' 70 Although the court conceded
that the reduced development potential lowered the market value of the prop-
erty, it reminded plaintiff that the Constitution does not guarantee a land-
owner the most beneficial use of his property.' 71 Further, the court noted that
162. Id Sailors' Snug Harbor was not retried. Instead, the city decided to purchase the
landmark buildings. See Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law, 36 LAW & CONTEMI'. PROBS. 363, 369-70 (1971).
163. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 131-32, 316 N.E.2d 305, 311-12, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 16-17 (1974). This case
involved J.P. Morgan, Jr.'s former residence, which was an early example of "Anglo-Italianate"
architecture and "'one of the few free standing Brownstones remaining in the City.'" Id. at 125,
316 N.E.2d at 308, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (quoting findings of Landmarks Preservation Commission).
164. Id. at 124, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (plaintiff was a religious corporation).
165. Id.
166. Id at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
167. Id at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at- 16.
168. 51 N.Y.2d 449,415 N.E.2d 922,43 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980); see supra notes 52-53 and accom-
panying text.
169. Id at 452, 415 N.E.2d at 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 934. The structure was "the first building
facade of the art nouveau style pioneered in this country by the noted architect Robert D. Kohn."
Id.
170. Id at 453, 415 N.E.2d at 924-25, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 934. The Society would have had to
demolish the house's protected facade to develop the property. This demolition would violate the
landmark commission's rules. Id.
171. Id at 454-55, 415 N.E.2d at 925-26, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935-36.
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whether the Society could get a reasonable return on the property was not the
applicable standard for determining whether the situation constituted a tak-
ing.172 Instead, the charitable-purpose standard was applicable. The question
was "whether the impact on the Society and its charitable activities is so severe
that the restrictions become confiscatory." 173 The court determined that there
was not a taking.
Two important factors shaped the court's decision. First, the Society did
not prove that the only feasible solution was demolition. The court contrasted
the Lutheran Church case, in which it was "[p]articularly significant" that the
church had tried to modify its structure to meet its needs and had not sought
demolition until it was clear that demolition was the only alternative. 174 Sec-
ond, the court determined that the Society was concerned only with the
landmark restriction's effect on developing the land for its most lucrative use.
The Society voiced no concern that the restrictions might interfere with its
religious or charitable activities.
175
First Presbyterian Church v. City Council of York 176 provides an interest-
ing comparison to the charitable-purpose cases. It also illustrates the impor-
tance of factual distinctions in taking cases. The crucial distinguishing factor
in York was that the historic building was part of a historic district; it was not
an isolated landmark.
In York the First Presbyterian Church sought a permit to demolish the
York House, a building adjoining the church edifice. 177 The York House was
the centerpiece of a city block of residences that provided an unspoiled view of
an 1890s street. After the Board of Historical Architectural Review recom-
mended denial of the demolition permit, the Church filed suit claiming that
denial of the permit amounted to a taking without just compensation. After
the lower court remanded the case to the Board for further findings, 178 the
Board conducted a second hearing and again recommended denial of a demo-
lition permit.
179
In the interval between the order of remand and the second appeal, the
case of Maher v. New Orleans80 was decided. In Maher claimant had been
denied a permit to demolish a cottage in the French Quarter of New Orleans.
The court set forth a test to determine when denial of a permit to demolish a
172. I1d at 454, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
173. Id at 454, 415 N.E.2d at 925, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
174. It still was possible in Societyfor Ethical Culture for the Society to make some modifica-
tions in the structure without disturbing the protected facade. 1d at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 936.
175. Id at 455-56, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
176. 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
177. Id at 158, 360 A.2d at 259. York House was glowingly described as "an exceptional
specimen of Victorian Italian-Villa architecture . . .representing the highest level of design,
workmanship, materials and aesthetic values of the time of its construction." Id
178. The court requested factual findings sufficient for the court to apply the charitable-pur-
pose test and determine whether there was a taking. Id at 158-59, 360 A.2d at 259-60.
179. Id at 159-60, 360 A.2d at 260.
180. 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), af' 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 905 (1976).
[Vol. 63
HISTORIC PRESER VATION ORDINANCES
structure in a historic district constitutes a taking. Maher established that an
ordinance is confiscatory and thus unconstitutional when it "goes so far as to
preclude the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably
adapted."'18 1 This test has evolved as the primary alternative to the charitable-
purpose test. To establish a taking under the Maher test, the claimant must
establish that sale of the property is impracticable, commercial rental cannot
provide a reasonable rate of return, and other potential uses of the property
are foreclosed.
18 2
On the second appeal in the York case, the church urged the court to
apply the charitable-purpose test.183 Instead, the court applied the Maher test
because of the factual dissimilarity between the single property designation of
a landmark and the area designation of a historic district.184 Because the
church had made no attempt to rent the premises over the previous five years,
had refused to consider offers to buy the property, and also had refused to
consider entering a cooperative arrangement to restore the building, the
church did not carry its burden of proof to establish a taking under the Maher
test.18 5 The court concluded that the building was "'capable of conversion to
a useful purpose without excessive Cost.' "s186 The court also noted the use that
the church intended for the property.'8 7 The church offered evidence that it
had no desire to use the property for religious purposes, but instead wished
only to use the property for landscaping and parking.
188
In Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott s9 the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals faced the same question presented in Maher and York. The property in
question adjoined a church in the Lafayette Square Historic District of St.
Louis. The church planned to demolish the historic townhouse on the adjoin-
ing property and replace it with a parking lot and recreation space. After de-
nial of its request by both the Landmarks and Urban Design Commission and
the Board of Adjustment, the church appealed to the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals.' 90 The court determined that the Board had failed to consider the eco-
nomic feasibility of restoration, and thus had applied the wrong standard in
reaching its decision. 191 The case was remanded to the Board with instruc-
tions to apply the Maher test.192
On remand, the Board again denied the demolition permit.' 93 In appeal-
181. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1066.
182. Id
183. York, 25 Pa. Commw. at 159, 360 A.2d at 259-60; see supra notes 158-75 and accompany-
ing text (charitable-purpose test).
184. York, 25 Pa. Commw. at 161, 360 A.2d at 261.
185. Id at 161-62, 360 A.2d at 261.
186. Id at 161, 360 A.2d at 261 (quoting lower court).
187. Id.
188. Id
189. 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
190. Id at 859.
191. The Board had considered only the technological feasibility of whether the dilapidated
building could be restored. Id at 861.
192. Id at 863-64.
193. Lafayette Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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ing this decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals, the church did not contend
that application of the ordinance to the church's property was a taking.194 In-
stead, the church contended that application of the ordinance to its property
was a denial of due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.19 5
Nevertheless, the court applied the Maher test in the same manner that the test
had been applied in taking cases. "If the owner is unable to restore [his prop-
erty] from an economic standpoint he must then establish [that] it is impracti-
cable to sell or lease the property or that no market exists for it at a reasonable
price." 196 The court concluded that the church had not satisfied the Maher
test and, therefore, that denial of the demolition permit did not violate the
church's constitutional rights.
197
Although there are few reported cases that address when application of a
historic preservation statute to church property constitutes a taking, some stan-
dards are discernible to guide courts in deciding this issue. No court has ap-
plied to church property the reasonable-return-on-investment standard that
applies to commercial property. 198 This is a sound approach-property used
for religious activities normally is not purchased for commercial investment.
In fact, many churches may prefer a noncommercial neighborhood so that the
congregation will not have to deal with heavy traffic and shortages of parking
space. Thus, it seems unlikely that a court ever would apply the traditional
commercial standard to a taking case involving church property; a court will
apply either the charitable-purpose standard or the Maher standard. 199
One major factor that affects which standard the court applies is the na-
ture of the church property-is it an individual landmark or is it property
within a historic district? All the reported cases have applied the more lenient
charitable-purpose standard to individual landmarks and the stricter Maher
standard to property within a historic district. Because there are so few re-
ported cases, this distinction could be the product of coincidence. The distinc-
tion, however, seems to be purposeful. In York the court originally had
intended to apply the charitable-purpose test to the church property, which
was in a historic district.2°° After Maher enunciated a new standard for his-
toric district property, however, the York court instructed the Board of Histori-
cal and Architectural Review to abandon the charitable-purpose test and
194. Id at 65.
195. Id The fifth amendment provides that "no person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment
makes the due process requirement applicable to the states ("nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law") and further prohibits states from
"deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
196. Lafayette Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61, 66 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).
197. Id at 65.
198. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 155.
199. It is more difficult to prove a taking under the Maherstandard. A building would have to
be extremely dilapidated for a court to find not only that the property was incapable of being sold
or rented but also that there was absolutely no potential use for the property.
200. YorA 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 158-59, 360 A.2d at 259-60.
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apply the Maher test. The court noted the factual dissimilarity between the
single property designation in Sailors' Snug Harbor and the area designation
in Maher.201 Because York involved an area designation, the Maher test was
applied.
202
The New York courts have continued to apply the charitable-purpose test
to historic landmarks even after Maher. Both Lutheran Church and Societyfor
Ethical Culture were decided after Maher. New York's continued application
of the charitable-purpose test should be viewed as coincidence; no cases in-
volving church property in historic districts have come before the New York
courts since Maher was decided. New York courts therefore should apply the
more stringent Maher standard to property in a historic district.
In a historic district, the church is surrounded by other historically signifi-
cant property; it benefits from its location. Because property values in a re-
stored area usually rise,203 a tenant or purchaser is easier to find.
Furthermore, the concept of a historic district is to preserve the unity and
character of an entire area. If a lenient taking test were applied, churches
could demolish their historic structures and destroy the unity of the historic
district.
In contrast, an individual landmark may be isolated from other historic
structures. The landmark church that becomes surrounded by commercial
structures, especially in a rapidly developing urban area, faces special
problems. There may be no room for the church to expand if the congrega-
tion's needs outgrow the structure. Congregation members may face parking
and traffic problems, especially if they attend services during the week. The
courts' application of the more lenient charitable purpose standard recognizes
these special problems of the isolated individual landmark.
Once a court has chosen the standard to apply, several factors affect how
the court applies the standard. The Maher test is a straightforward factual
inquiry to determine whether the claimant landowner has met its burden of
proof. The court makes simple yes-or-no determinations of whether the
claimant has proved that it cannot feasibly rent, sell, or otherwise use its
property.2°4
The court's decision in a historic district case also may be affected by the
church's intended use of the property. The York court noted that the church
offered evidence that it had no desire to use the property for religious pur-
poses.205 Thus, a court may be less inclined to find a taking when the church
plans a secular use for the altered property.
The York court only hinted that intended use would be a factor. In the
charitable purpose cases, however, the property's proposed use clearly is a fac-
tor. A court cannot find that a historic preservation ordinance interferes with
201. Id at 161, 360 A.2d at 261.
202. Id
203. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 180-88 & 196.
205. York, 25 Pa. Commw. at 162, 360 A.2d at 261.
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a charitable purpose when the church does not use the land for a charitable
purpose. The New York Court of Appeals weighed this factor heavily in Soci-
etyfor Ethical Culture. The court noted that "[tihere is no genuine complaint
that eleemosynary activities within the landmark are wrongfully disrupted
S. .,"206 exhibiting little sympathy for the "charitable" organization that seeks
only to put its property to its most lucrative use.20 7 In contrast, the same court
found a taking in Lutheran Church, in which the building was used for reli-
gious purposes.
2°s
Another factor that affects the court's application of a taking standard is
whether the church has investigated alternative dispositions of the property. A
court will not be inclined to find a taking when a church seeks a demolition
permit without having explored alternatives that may alter the building but
preserve its historic significance. The New York Court of Appeals explicitly
cited this factor in Society for Ethical Culture,209 when the Society did not
demonstrate that demolition was the only feasible solution.210 The court con-
trasted this with the attempts at modification in the Lutheran Church case:
"Particularly significant in the Lutheran Church case was the fact that the
church had tried unsuccessfully to modify the structure to suit its needs, and
that no further accommodation, short of demolition and rebuilding, would
have alleviated the serious space problems which had arisen." 211
The constitutionality of historic preservation restrictions applied to
church property is a particularly unsettled area of the law. Historic preserva-
tion law still is in the formative stage. Courts can seek guidance, however,
from cases applying historic preservation regulations to commercial property
and traditional zoning ordinances to church property. To determine whether
a historic preservation regulation interferes with the free exercise of religion,
courts must focus on the crucial question of the nature of the church's pro-
posed use of its property.212 Merely raising a first amendment claim should
not be conclusive; the first amendment is not a talisman before which the well-
recognized public welfare benefits attendant to historic preservation inevitably
must yield. Nevertheless, courts should recognize the special status of the first
amendment and weigh its guarantees as a factor in balancing the church's
freedom of religion against the state's interest in historic preservation.
213
To determine whether the application of a historic preservation regula-
tion to church property constitutes a taking, courts may apply either the chari-
table-purpose test or the Maher test. The outcomes depend primarily on the
facts of each particular case. In deciding which test to apply, courts must con-
206. Societyfor Ethical Culture 51 N.Y.2d at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
207. Id.
208. Lutheran Churc4 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
209. Societyfor Ethical Culture, 51 N.Y.2d at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936; see
supra note 174 and accompanying text.
210. Societyfor Ethical Culture, 51 N.Y.2d at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
211. Id at 455, 415 N.E.2d at 926, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 79-95.
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sider the nature of the church property-is it an isolated landmark in a crowded
urban area or is it an integral part of a historic district? The location of the
church property, however, should not be the sole factor used to determine
which test applies. A landmark church may be in a small town, with room to
expand, and may be the only historic structure in the town. Under these cir-
cumstances, a court should not automatically apply the more lenient charita-
ble-purpose test as it would to the urban landmark church.
The establishment clause mandates governmental neutrality toward reli-
gious institutions. Thus, it seems clear that total exemption of church property
from historic preservation regulations would be unconstitutional. Certainly
any special consideration given to churches would have to be given to all non-
profit organizations. 214 Governmental grants to churches to restore and main-
tain their property also would violate the establishment clause.215 Thus, there
is a clear need for private citizens to act when the government is forbidden to
act. Private groups could raise funds to help maintain historically significant
church property. Private citizens with expertise in the maintenance of historic
property could contribute their knowledge and technical assistance. The eco-
nomic benefits to the neighborhoods and the city provide powerful incentives
for such private efforts. Although many problems remain unsolved, histori-
cally significant church property can be preserved, within the bounds of the
Constitution, if church property owners, local governmental units, and private
citizens work together to seek innovative solutions. Cooperation and flexibil-
ity should guide owners of church property and local historic district and his-
toric properties commissions. Each side must be sensitive to the special
interests and concerns of the other;, litigation should be the last resort.
ELIZABETH CAMERON RICHARDSON
214. The importance of extending benefits to other nonprofit organizations is articulated in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz the Supreme Court upheld tax exemptions for
religious organizations for properties used solely for religios worship. The exemption applied
not only to churches but also to a broad class of nonprofit organizations. The broad application of
the exemption was crucial to the Court's decision to uphold the exemption.
[The state] has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches
as such, rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad
class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals,
libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups.
Id. at 673. See generally Menapace, Preservation Laws and Houses of Worship, in PaAcTIsINo
LAW INST., HisToRIc PRESERVATION LAW 1982 495, 507-08 (Walz granted exemption not to reli-
gious organizations specifically but to charitable organizations generally); Xeller, supra note 14, at
2013-15 (discussing church exemption from landmark laws as violation of establishment clause).215. Greenawalt, supra note 50, at 492. See also Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which the United States Supreme Court stated: "If the
State may not erect buildings in which religious activities are to take place, it may not maintain
such buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair." Id. at 777.
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